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BOOK REVIEW
PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, by Barry Kellman. Chicago, IL:
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 1986. Pp. v + 651. Hardcover.
$49.50.
Reviewed by George J. Alexander*
Is antitrust dead? A book written in a prior decade would not
have addressed that problem. However, with deregulation abroad
and antitrust deemphasized in Washington, is there a need for a
book on private antitrust litigation?
In his book, Professor Kellman quickly points out that the vol-
ume of federal litigation is very low. Only one recent Supreme Court
decision has involved the government, and not since 1978 has the
government successfully litigated a liability claim before the Court.
Even in the lower courts, a government case is a comparatively rare
event.' "Yet antitrust litigation has, in quantity terms [sic], ex-
ploded," 2 the author asserts. The explosion comes, of course, from
private antitrust litigation. To prove his point, Professor Kellman
asserts that "just over six times as mny" private antitrust actions
were commenced in 1980 as in 1960. This argument would be more
persuasive if the author had used a-year subsequent to 1980 because
a number of the more limiting antitrust precedents came in the 80's."
1987 by George J. Alexander
* Former Dean, and current Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law;
A.B., 1953, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1959, University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., 1964,
J.S.D., 1969, Yale. Admitted to practice in Illinois, 1960; New York, 1961; California, 1974;
Educational Consultant to the Comptroller General of the United States.
1. B. KELLMAN, PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION vi, vii (1985) [hereinafter
KELLMAN].
2. KELLMAN, supra note 1, at vii.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing, 106
S. Ct. 2613 (1985) (market power required for per se boycott); National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (price fixing
governed by rule of reason in special cases); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2 (1984) (per se tying requires substantial market power in tying product); Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Services Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (dictum requiring proof that resale price
maintenance defendant did not act independently).
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Even so, Professor Kellman is clearly correct.8
The changes of the recent past have been the product of increas-
ing application of economic principles to law. Professor Kellman
appears to disapprove of this trend.' "The point is this: Antitrust is
law, not economics; and it is enforced by the judiciary, not
academia."' He is right again. Courts continue to defy economists in
announcing antitrust principles.8 It is Professor Kellman's goal to
overcome a tendency he decries-that of over generalizing on the ba-
sis of a few cases-by discussing virtually all cases decided in the
area over the last decade. He claims his chief contribution is organiz-
ing rather than merely presenting the law.'
Professor Kellman begins his effort by defining an elusive con-
cept in antitrust: competition. " 'Competition' means the same thing
in antitrust law as it does in athletics; it is a process of interaction in
which each individual participant strives to obtain scarce rewards,
subject to the right of every other participant to do the same." This
is a competition that antitrust protects, according to the author." In
teaching Antitrust, this commentator has spent up to five weeks pur-
suing the Court's meaning of competition, and is surprised at so
facile a definition. How would it apply to Chief Justice Warren's
definition of competition in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States?11 In
5. After 1980, the number of private antitrust suits declined. In 1980, 1457 private
antitrust suits were commenced in U.S. District Courts while in 1960 there had only been 228.
By 1985, the number of cases filed had dropped to 1052. If 1985 (the date of publication) had
been the reference point, Professor Kellman could claim that there were 4.6 times as many
private cases as in 1960 not "just over 6 times" as many. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 128 (1984); LAWYER'S ALMANAC 814
(1986).
6. Kellman is of the opinion that:
There is a tendency, all too prevalent, to view cases in isolation and thereby
over-generalize on the basis of too little information. There is another tendency
to not examine legal cases at all but to view antitrust as a tabula rasa upon
which to formulate elegant models of consumer welfare. Worst of all, there is a
tendency to reduce antitrust law to the one-dimensional pursuit. of economic
efficiency while ignoring the lesson of nearly a century of enforcement and liti-
gation that antitrust should be a multi-dimensional integration of principles,
capable of development over time.
KELLMAN, supra note 1, at v.
7. id.
8. "Keifer-Stewart and Albrecht place horizontal agreements to fix prices on the same
legal - even if not economic - footing as agreements to fix minimum or uniform prices."
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 451 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (emphasis added).
9. KELLMAN, supra note 1, at viii.
10. Id. at vi.
11. "It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to
recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, lo-
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fact, commentators who thought that competitors were the principal
beneficiaries of antitrust and those who thought antitrust was
designed to serve consumer welfare, derived their definition of com-
petition from the Clayton Act,"' rather than from case law. Before
leaving the preface Professor Kellman has issued a challenge. Anti-
trust is not what this commentator and most other academics have
always taught in class. It cannot be derived from generalizations
about a small number of cases, but must be found by looking at the
totality of cases for at least a ten year period. The reader should
therefore feel quite free to disregard any critical comments in this
review by attributing them to an academic's refusal to accept those
premises.
It is undeniable that the book is filled with citations to lower
court cases that have not generally found their way into antitrust
commentary. The book is divided into four major parts. The first
part covers the core of antitrust in 191 pages. It follows equally sized
sections on exemptions, on who may be sued and what may be recov-
ered, and finally on procedural issues. Generally, there are 25
chapters with each chapter boasting a short, usually two or three
page, summary in which the rules discussed in the chapter are set
forth. These summaries are no doubt useful to those wishing a fast
overview of the field.
A more catholic view of antitrust cases apparently does not lead
to a view of antitrust which differs from that developed by concen-
trating on leading Supreme Court precedent. Understandably, fed-
eral courts are particularly mindful of Supreme Court precedents in
the field of antitrust. The major sections of antitrust law do not de-
fine such central concepts as the meaning of restraint of trade,'3
monopolization, 4 substantially to lessen competition.18 Over time
courts have given them meaning and the Supreme Court's definitions
have naturally been the ones that have prevailed. Even given his
broader perspective, Professor Kellman spends the first half of his
chapter on mergers and acquisitions, principally talking about Su-
preme Court merger cases. In other areas, however, Supreme Court
cases are minimized by the discussion of the more numerous lower
court cases.
cally owned businesses." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
12. "[Alsset acquisition is prohibited where the effect of the acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition. . . ." Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1985).
13. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1985).
14. Id. at § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
15. Clayton Act §§ 3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 19 (1985).
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Sometimes the result is curious. For example, in discussing the
criteria of culpability in exclusion of competitors, Professor Kellman
cites Silver v. New York Stock Exchange" as the "leading decision in
this area.''11 He sees it as epitomized in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc.' 8 in which the court announced a three-pronged
test the third element of which was "[tlhe association provides proce-
dural safeguards which assure that the restraint is not arbitrary and
which provides a basis for a judicial review."' 9 He then acknowl-
edges the Supreme Court decision in Northwest Wholesale Station-
ers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary and Printing Co.20 and correctly
quotes it as saying, "The absence of procedural safeguards can in no
sense determine the antitrust analysis. . . . [Tihe antitrust laws do
not themselves impose on joint ventures a requirement of process."''.
When he discusses resale price maintenance he cites Albrecht v.
Herald Co."' for the proposition that maximum price fixing is illegal
per se. He asserts that "while Albrecht has not been significantly
limited, neither has it been expanded." 28 He simply does not ac-
knowledge its express reaffirmation in Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society 4 which he cites himself in the chapter on collu-
sion.' In discussing the state action exemptions Professor Kellman
cites Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.' for the position that
"[t]he patent provision of the Constitution is strictly limited in that a
patent monopoly may not be used in disregard of the antitrust
laws."' 1 Stiffel involved neither a "patent monopoly" nor a violation
of the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court simply indicated that Illi-
nois' unfair competition law could not, in effect, extend protection
comparable to patent protection to unpatentable designs. Its law was
preempted by the patent power given to Congress in article I section
8 of the Constitution. The citation of Stiffel does little to add to the
author's citation of Parker v. Brown which crisply deals with the
same point. "A state does not give immunity to those who violate the
16. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
17. KELLMAN, supra note 1, at 43.
18. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
19. Id. at 1064, 1065.
20. 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
21. KELLMAN, supra note 1, at 47.
22. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
23. KFLLMAN, supra note 1, at 105.
24. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
25. KELLMAN, supra note 1, at 7.
26. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
27. KELLMAN, supra note 1, at 203.
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Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
their action is lawful."28
As these examples indicate, one can quibble with some of the
book's assertions. In the main, however, the reader will find a wealth
of information about antitrust in its pages. The author attempts not
only to reconcile Supreme Court decisions, which by itself would be
a sufficiently heroic act, but he attempts to include the reconciliation
of lower court cases as well. Given the goal of rationalizing and or-
ganizing so large a body of law, the author should be commended
irrespective of minor flaws.
As this commentator admitted at the beginning of the review, he
was probably made more critical than usual. The suggestion by a
law professor that the academic perspective of the field is inappropri-
ate is too threatening, and may well be wrong.
28. Id. at 202 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)).
1987]

